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***NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE***

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



Avoiding a Hollow Force: Force Planning With Any Budget

by

WILLIAM W. WHITTENBERGER JR.
Lt Col, USAF Res


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
A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.


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
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ABSTRACT

The United States military has experienced a predictable cycle in force structure development that leads to a “hollow force” after substantial budgetary reductions. The author’s thesis is that by better understanding the system used to develop military force structure, and by appreciating relevant historic examples, the military can institute measures to achieve balance in national security and to break that cycle.

Some Department of Defense (DoD) economic forecasts project that the U.S. government cannot sustain the continued large budget deficit and resulting, debilitating national debt.¹ It is significant that the causal factors are due to the rising personnel and health care costs, both in the military and collectively in the federal government. As a result, every possible option will be scrutinized to control such costs.

The research method for this thesis involved: the examination of the U.S. strategic framework, and its limitations, which is the foundation of the current force structure; the background of the historical pattern leading to a “hollow force”; and potential methods for achieving balance. Without a basic understanding of strategy at every level and its connection to resources in the U.S., there is no viable foundation for stable planning. The study of vignettes from the last two major conflicts, the geo-political and economic conditions leading up to them, and the military postures throughout their eras, were researched in order to gain a better understanding of the recurring patterns, and finally, through exploring methods of achieving balance, multiple avenues opened to maintain military capabilities while continuing to reduce overall capacity.

¹ The U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), The 2010 Joint Operational Environment Briefing (Government Printing Office/electronic publication, Washington D.C., 2010) http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2010/JOE_2010_o.pdf (accessed 16 April, 2012)

The author begins with the strategic framework and force planning concepts in relation to that framework. As the initial topic, this discussion is ineffectual without in some measure establishing the foundation and reasoning behind the framework and its related force structuring. A hybrid model is used to define strategy and describe the framework. After the conceptual overview, the research report proceeds to the three conjoined integral component (cornerstones) system, which was the basis for force structuring over the last twenty plus years.²

The second topic is composed of historical vignettes, which include the force structuring events leading up to the Vietnam and Desert Storm conflicts, through the outcomes of each, to include the Packard Commission and the Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Through the study of vignettes from the last two major conflicts, the geo-political and economic conditions leading up to them, and the military postures throughout those eras, one can glean a better understanding of the recurring patterns in modern U.S. force structuring. A study of the changing military, geo-political, and economic environments in each of the selected instances influenced and guided specific decision models. The vignettes of those decisions and events show that some enacted ideas failed, others succeeded, and still others that had great validity were not accepted. The best concepts are then applied in the reengineering to achieve balance section.

Through exploring methods of achieving balance, multiple avenues open to maintain military capabilities while continuing to reduce overall capacity. The author begins with the concept of optimizing balances of the three cornerstones of force

² Paul Van Riper, "Planninig For And Applying Military Force: An Examination Of Terms", *Strategic Studies Institute*, March 2006, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/> (accessed 16 April, 2012), 3.

structuring, which are manpower, equipment, and operations. The paper then addresses maintaining capability and gaining overall readiness while reducing costs through the appropriate type of training for the Reserve Component. Finally, the author concludes with techniques to optimize force structure planning by using different types of integrations.

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INTRODUCTION

The United States military has experienced a predictable cycle in force structure development that leads to a “hollow force” after substantial budgetary reductions. The author’s thesis is that by better understanding the system used to develop military force structure, and by appreciating relevant historic examples, the military can institute measures to achieve balance in national security and to break that “hollow force” cycle.

The year 2012 is even more challenging than previous years in the ways that resource constraints are affecting the overall Department of Defense (DoD) budget. While there are always resource constraints and concerns over the percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) that is spent on defense, ; now the 2012 defense budget update warns of even greater reductions. The current budget reduction facing the DoD is estimated at \$487 billion over ten years, including ten percent of the Army and Marine manpower by 2017, with the potential to cut an additional ten percent of the budget, or more, over the same period.¹ The Air Force has already closed the F-22 production line, is slowing the purchase of the F-35 airframes, and expects to decrease substantially its total number of tactical aircraft and fighter wings.² The Navy is likely to decommission seven cruisers and cancel the acquisition of two Littoral Combat Ships and six High Speed Vessels.³ Several bases will be closing overseas, and another potential Base

¹ Cassata, Burns, Dozier, and Baldor, “U.S. ground forces could be cut by 100,000, Defense Secretary Panetta says”, *Associated Press*, Jan 26, 2012, http://www.nola.com/military/index.ssf/2012/01/us_ground_forces_would_be_cut.html (accessed 16 April, 2012).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round is on the horizon.⁴ Beyond that, through regular cost-avoidance exercises, and withdrawing forces from both Iraq and Afghanistan, many of the initial cost savings by the Services would have been preempted by the original budgetary reduction proposal. With even more reductions, military capabilities will be reduced to a degree that risk will increase to unacceptably high levels.




Figure 1⁵

Some DoD economic forecasts project that the U.S. government cannot sustain the continued large budget deficit.⁶ It is significant that the causal factors are due to the rising personnel and health care costs, both in the military and collectively in the federal government. Paradoxically, even as the numbers of actual personnel are in decline, as depicted in Figure 1, other complications include cutting 100,000 more personnel and

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Travis Sharp, "Vision Meets Reality: 2010 QDR and 2011 Defense Budget, Policy Brief", *Center for a New American Security*, 2011, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/2011DefenseBudget_Sharp_Feb2010_code904_policybrief_0.pdf (accessed 16 April, 2012).

⁶ USJFCOM, *op cit*.

total personnel costs continuing to rise.⁷ As a result, every possible option will be scrutinized to control such costs.

Figure 2 (below) shows that since the Korean Conflict, even though the total dollars spent on the Department of Defense budget have somewhat increased, and the overall percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has steadily decreased, the gap continues to grow between the two. This demonstrates that government defense spending, although climbing to an all time high total in real terms, has steadily declined as a percentage of the GDP. However, given the challenges of large budget deficits and the resultant growth of national debt, declines in percentage of GDP will continue to put pressure on defense spending.




Figure 2⁸

⁷ Cassata, Burns, Dozier, and Baldor, op cit.

⁸ Ibid.

Figure 3 (below) shows that DoD spending has remained relatively static over the years while the mandatory and net interest portions of Federal spending are on a steady increase. The additions of new programs, such as mandatory health care legislation, have led to almost exponential growth.

The defense budget seems small in comparison to the total federal budget. Some analysts may consider it miniscule, as a cornerstone of national policy, when viewed as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP). In fiscal year 2011, the defense base budget was roughly 3.5 percent of the gross domestic product, and 4.6 percent including supplemental “war costs”. The base defense budget covers annual readiness expenses, whereas the supplemental budget covers additional expenditures like wars and natural disasters.




Figure 3⁹

⁹ Ibid.

One should note that the picture is even more complex than it initially appears. Almost 50 percent of the defense cost increases went to the base defense budget, the majority of which went to cost increases alone. Procurement costs increased while equipment decreased and aged, manpower costs increased while total personnel numbers stayed roughly the same, and operations costs increased while total operational training performed decreased. The military is spending more money for less total personnel and equipment today than it did even before the end of the Cold War. One important note is that both the base defense budget and the war budget are decreasing for the first time since September 11, 2001.




Figure 4¹⁰

¹⁰ Ibid.

Figure 4 shows that, except for the period when the Reagan Administration was building the military establishment in the 1980s after the failure of the Desert One rescue effort in Iran, DoD appropriations as a share of the Gross Domestic Product were in a steady decline. Since September 11, 2001, the DoD has maintained a supplemental budget in addition to the budget covering the base costs to fund wartime costs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The total base cost (DoD without post-9/11 war costs) since the end of the Desert Storm Conflict has been between three and four percent. This does not include the costs for Afghanistan and Iraq, which, according to Figure 4, amount to approximately an additional one percent on top of the base budget.

It is well understood that one of the enduring national interests, and the reason for the military, is defending the nation. The major issue with the large-scale DoD reductions and attendant loss of capabilities will be an unacceptable increased risk to the nation. It is through great labor that military commanders and planners often struggle to mitigate threats, accept increased risk, and assume a capable force within program and budget guidance.

The current “Long War” threat to the nation is not projected to change.¹¹ If such threats to the nation remain high, and there is a further reduction in the size of the force, the readiness level will surely decrease. When capabilities of the Total Force erode to the level where they are no longer able to deal with those present and emerging threats, the resulting state can be described as a “hollow force”. In essence, the Services experience a weakening to the point where they become incapable of meeting their responsibilities.

Force programmers in the Services also have the challenge that a “hollow force” can happen, even with apparently sufficient budgets. Although this is obviously more

¹¹ USJFCOM, *op cit.*

likely at times of very tight resource constraints, even during ample budgetary support, erroneous decisions and actions can produce very little capability. Conversely, certain actions and choices made during times of lean budgets can produce high capability for low cost. Budget and personal agendas over the years tend to make the difference. One consistency is that regardless of selection of choices and actions, or the percentage of the budget, Congressional scrutiny and influence are always present. These issues had to be addressed even in the time of Baron Antoine Henri De Jomini, as he stated:

When the control of the public funds is in the hands of those affected by local interest or party spirit, they may be so over scrupulous and injurious as to take all power to carry on the war from the executive, whom very many people seem to regard as a public enemy rather than as a chief devoted to all the national interests.¹²

Despite the competition for budget authority, critical capability losses need not be inevitable. In addition, reductions in cost and capacity do not have to be negative in their effects. Conversely, they will have high negative impacts if the force structure planners do not adapt to the mandatory reductions and evolve with the changing environment. It is important to understand that the way that the military responds and adapts to the new and seriously constrained budget can cause an intellectual growth period and produce a smaller, better integrated, and more cost efficient force structure. The re-examination and alteration of current U.S. processes and mindsets can be the catalyst for the enlightenment of future military force structuring.

The Department of Defense (DoD) needs to use updated force planning tools to prevent a future “hollow force”. In order to break the continuous cycle of the past fifty years that consistently led to a “hollow force” structure, U.S. military force structuring

¹² Jomini, A. H., and C. Messenger, *The Art of War* (London: Greenhill Books, 1996), 45.

planners must seek to gain a complete understanding of the U.S. strategic framework, and its limitations, which is the foundation of the current force structure.

Clearly, methods to achieve balance and the background of the historical pattern leading to a “hollow force” offer many daunting challenges. Strategy is one such challenge. Without a basic understanding of strategy at every level and its connection to resources in the U.S., there is no viable foundation for stable planning. Strategic thinking, as it applies in this short research report, can be informed by vignettes from the last two major conflicts, the geo-political and economic conditions leading up to them, and the military postures throughout their eras. By examining these vignettes, one can glean a better understanding of the recurring patterns. Finally, through exploring methods of achieving balance, multiple avenues are opened to maintain military capabilities while continuing to reduce overall capacity.

The United States military has experienced a predictable cycle in force structure development that leads to a “hollow force” after substantial budgetary reductions. By better understanding the system used to develop military force structure, and by appreciating relevant historic examples, the military can institute measures to achieve balance in national security and to break that cycle.

CHAPTER 1: STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

“Both strategy and planning use ends, ways, and means, and are bounded by criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.”¹ Harry R. Yarger

To have an effective discussion, we must first establish the foundation and reasoning behind both the strategic framework and force planning concepts (sometimes referred to as “constructs”) as well as the related force-structuring construct. A hybrid model will be used to define strategy and describe the framework. After the conceptual overview, the discussion will proceed to the three conjoined integral component (cornerstones) system on which was the basis for force structuring over the last twenty plus years.²

Hybrid Strategic Model

The hybrid model of the strategic framework is an amalgamation of the Yarger models, the Bartlett model, and additional factors and environmental information. Carl Von Clausewitz discussed “ends” and “means” in *On War*, as did other strategic thinkers, but General Maxwell D. Taylor is credited with adding “ways” (otherwise known as strategy) to the model during his visit to U.S. Army War College in 1981.³ This model takes the standard ends, means, and ways used in most strategic discussions today

¹ Harry R. Yarger, & Army War College (U.S.), *Strategic theory for the 21st century: The little book on big strategy*. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 5.

² Paul Van Riper, *op cit.*, 3.

³ Paul Van Riper, *op cit.*, 4.

and provides inputs of greater depth to articulate a more comprehensive model. That model can be used from the strategic level down to the tactical level, as applied to the Yarger strategic levels.⁴




Figure 5⁵

Yarger's model uses enduring National Interests to develop an overall Grand Strategy for the nation.⁶ This Grand Strategy is the overarching Whole-of-Government approach, at the highest conceptual level, used by the President to create policy for the different Departments and Agencies, as well as to develop the National Security Strategy

⁴ Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 19.

⁵ Harry R. Yarger, *op cit.*, 19.

⁶ Harry R. Yarger & Army War College (U.S.), *op cit.*, 10.

(NSS).⁷ The president uses the NSS to focus all elements of national power to pursue interests and objectives. This is also where the unified policy splits, with fragments redirected to individual departments and agencies for the responsibilities that belong to them respectively. The line of strategy is direct and clear in downward flow, but does not presently provide lateral guidance to direct integration among higher-level organizations, departments, and agencies.

The different departments and agencies then use the NSS and other guidance to develop their own strategies. They also use NSS to ensure application of enduring national interests in internal documents that will flow throughout their organizations, and attach them to current and perceived threats and challenges from the strategic level down to each successive level. For example, the Department of Defense (DoD) uses the NSS to develop the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report⁸ and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) uses it to develop the National Military Strategy (NMS)⁹. The theater strategy is then created from those documents, among a number of other sources of guidance, all the way from the strategic to the tactical level. This is a process that develops the national policy and goals at the top level, applies them appropriately at subsequent levels, and uses those goals to create sub-strategies and apply resources at each level.

⁷ The U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010).

⁸ The Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010).

⁹ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011).

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is a framework for the CJCS to execute his duties as mandated.¹⁰ It is the central structure that studies the threats to our nation and way of life, links the national strategy to both threats and military resources, and then guides the strategy and resources to plans and action. The CJCS gets the ends or goals from the President and his staff through the NSS and from the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and DoD through the QDR. The Joint Staff refines the data and creates the NMS to provide the overall ways and means of the military. The NMS further refines the ends or goals and sets specific military objectives for follow-on documents.¹¹

The JSPS is where the military ends are tied to action. The CJCS produces the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)¹², which is used to create specific strategic plans (TCP, OPLANs, etc.) from the stated ends defined in the NMS. The Guidance for the Employment of the Forces (GEF)¹³, produced by DoD, tells the Combatant Commanders what the ends are and the JSCP tells them how to achieve them. Basically, the two documents define for the military the mission, based on potential or perceived threats, and how to execute it.

This leads to the responsibility of the CJCS to advise the Services, the SecDef, and the President.¹⁴ It is at this point that the CJCS takes the inputs from the military (Services, Unified Commands, etc) and advises in both directions. He advises through the military by guiding requirements through Defense Policy and Planning Guidance

¹⁰ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 3100.01B, The Joint Strategic Planning System*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 12 December 2008).

¹¹ Harry R. Yarger, *op cit*.

¹² The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual CJCSM 3110.01, Joint Strategic Capabilities Statement*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office).

¹³ The Department of Defense, *Guidance for the Employment of the Force*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office).

¹⁴ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCSI 3100.01B*.

(DPPG), Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), Functional Capabilities Board (FCB), etc. The CJCS also advises the President and SecDef through budget recommendations, force structure and capabilities recommendations, and other areas as required according to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01B. The last area of the CJCS mandated requirements is the “assess” requirement. Through processes that lead to documents such as the Joint Strategy Review and the Chairman’s Risk Assessment, the CJCS reviews and reports to the President on the all of the military programs, processes, and risks, informs the President and SecDef on threat and resource issues, makes recommendations to the SecDef for the QDR, and other duties as required by CJCSI 3100.01B. Specifically, regarding the budget, the CJCS makes recommendations to mitigate risk associated with budget shortfalls.

Bartlett Model




Figure 6¹⁵

¹⁵ Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes, “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning” in *Strategy and Force Planning, Fourth Edition*, (Newport, RI, Naval War College, 2004), 19.

The Bartlett model, with factors added to his original work, begins and ends with an assessment of the Security Environment, as this has the capability of “shaping” or altering the objectives.¹⁶ There must be an assessment of the security environment (threats, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, etc – both internal and external) to develop appropriate goals, based on interests. Bartlett defines the Ends or Goals as levels of objectives. These desired goals must be in alignment from the lowest level to those established in the NSS. Strategy then becomes the bridge that links the goals to the limited resources. It is the way to achieve the stated ends. Each country has limited assets, and national budgets are finite, making resource constraints a continuous factor. Defining and working within the bounds of resource constraints has direct impact on each variable in the model. Resource constraint consideration and application is imperative to ensuring the necessary force structure can be developed. In the area of forecasting military force structure requirements, history demonstrates how easily nations have found it to mistakenly develop military forces that are so vulnerable to quick and decisive defeat. A striking example of this was the outdated trench warfare force posture of French forces in World War II.

The definition of the Means (also known as capabilities) variable in the model is the tools, tangible and intangible, that a country possesses.¹⁷ They can be diplomatic, informational, economic, military, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement.

The final major variable in the model is risk. All other components affect risk. The balance of the main components, the environment, and the factors will define the

¹⁶ Ibid., 19.

¹⁷ Ibid., 20.

level of risk assumed at the end of the process. Yet, even more so, it is the mismatches and imbalances that directly define the total risk.¹⁸

The model directly applies additional factors to give it greater depth and definition. As informally discussed by professors at the Joint Forces Staff College and during the Joint Advanced Warfighting School coursework, key factors such as assumptions need to be continually considered. They need identification and definition to gain greater depth of understanding and ensure the correct formulation of strategy. Examples include specific critical treaties, key partners and allies remaining for the specified duration listed in a plan, and national and military changing intelligence. Another family of operational drivers to consider is VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity).¹⁹ Again, defining these provides greater depth and understanding for the complete process.

All of the variables listed above affect the entire process. It is a holistic relationship. A change in any variable has direct impact on the other variables. Any imbalances are evident and finally resolved at the risk variable²⁰. An example would be a change in resources, without a change in any of the other components, would directly relate to more or less risk. An addition of appropriately applied resources, with no change in the strategic environment, and with goals and strategy remaining static, should translate to mitigating added potential risks. Conversely, a reduction in resources, without any other changes, will translate into directly assuming more overall risk by mitigating less of the potential risks.

¹⁸ Ibid., 21.

¹⁹ T. Owen Jacobs, *Strategic Leadership: The Competitive Edge*, (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2002), 24.

²⁰ Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes, *op cit.*, 23.

If force capabilities change, and the threat remains the same, either the risk changes or the strategy must change. Strategy will develop the ways to mitigate risk. Potential threats can be changed to show seemingly that overall risk is less. An example of this would be when the strategy changes for a force structure intended to cover two major regional conflicts simultaneously to a strategy and force only necessary to cover one major regional conflict. In an effort to prevent reducing the force structure, and at the same time spreading the forces too thin to effectively cover one region, in a poor attempt to provide forces to both regions in the two regional conflict strategy, and increasing risk throughout, the strategy, forces, and focus change to only one regional conflict, reducing the force structure effectively and proportionately to build the proper force necessary for success in that region.

Risk also can be thought of as the obverse, or the opposite side, of the likelihood of success. In other words, high risk causes low likelihood of success. If the overall end-state is an effective and efficient force structure, and any one of the variables changes, it directly affects the likelihood of successfully achieving that end state. An increase in risk will equate to a decrease in the likelihood of success.

Conjoined Cornerstones Model

Depending on the amount of resources available, a force-structuring construct may be threat based, capabilities based, or capacity based. Where threat is the concern, it initially drives the process or framework. Threat becomes the dominant entering argument informing the strategic thinking. Defining the response to potential threats and

building the force structure to cover that defined response is a threat based system. An example would be building the force structure to respond to two likely major regional conflicts. A threat-based force-structuring construct has the capability of being based on the current threat or expanding to any desired potential threat level. An example today might be basing the force-structuring construct on countering the growing military strengths of China, Iran, or other nation state or expanding it even further to combating the threat of violent extremist activities throughout the world while fighting two major regional conflicts. The focus is not on actual fighting requirements or capabilities, only potential scenarios, and has the nation's budget as its only limitation. This force structure may lack needed capabilities due to focusing only on countering specific threats, nations, or regions, or it may cause the department to exceed fiscal limitations by trying to prepare for all potential threats, to include all of the unlikely ones.

It can be argued that the nature of the threat has changed greatly, and that threat-based development has become much more complicated. Therefore, assessing the threat will become exponentially more difficult. Between 1962 and the early 1990s, when nation states defined the threat, there were limited numbers of nation states, and many were allies, making it that much easier to define and assess the overall threat potential in the world.

Since the Cold War ended, the threat has evolved and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Regional, non-state conflict involving tribal differences internal to a state was the initial change in the face of potential threat throughout the world. That changed again in a very short period to the widely spread transnational non-state violent extremist organizations creating potential and real threats throughout the world. Each

successive change has expanded and become more vague. Exactly defined borders, military strength, specific weapons system threats, defined leadership and tactics have changed and grown to the point of very little definition and information. The present key to assessing potential world threats is by knowing unstable and unfriendly states, in addition to linking and tracking violent extremist and criminal organizations. The task is now more about the ways that the U.S. might be threatened, and developing appropriate and effective countering strategies. Viewing a map, one can see the areas of potential conflict by studying cultural chokepoints, areas of known scarcity of food water and other materials, recognizing regional youth bulge issues, and so forth. The true genius is in preparing for future potential threat, and developing the necessary future force, capable of deterring and defeating that threat. The key is to discover, recognize, and counter today's poorly defined threats and to correctly forecast the next change in the face of threat throughout the world. The cycle is continuous.

The concept of threat may be so volatile and so vague that strategic planning needs to include a more defined, yet equally powerful and intellectual system. That is the reasoning behind the original creation and shift to the capabilities based system of strategic thinking. A capabilities based system is one that bases the force structure development upon defined requirements and capabilities. This breaks down the overall potential threat into mission type requirements, defines the mission sets to cover those requirements, and then builds the capabilities to cover the mission sets. Although built on the capabilities that a nation feels it needs to possess, finished intelligence, and self-identified threats still form the basis for force structure development. Care must be taken lest the resulting force structure may not be able to cover the actual threats and may cause

the Department of Defense to reassess risk and again be in jeopardy of exceeding fiscal limitations.

A capacity-based system is one that builds the force structure based upon whatever the budget will allow. The focus is primarily on fiscal limitations. This force structure may lack capabilities or be entirely incapable of defending against the actual threats. Under such circumstances, it is commonplace to see a pattern of critics questioning the integrity, professionalism, and judgment of military planners and commanders. In the budget submission in 1962, a subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services stated the plan “was conceived by Army planners who were apparently more concerned with the problem of remaining within budgetary guidelines than with basically satisfying military requirements for increased readiness.”²¹

Prior to 2000 and Secretary Rumsfeld as the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. based its force-structuring construct off a threat-based system. Secretary Rumsfeld, in the first review in 2001, tried to move away from what he deemed a fixation on the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, as the current threat was more than those two and less defined. He subsequently converted the Department of Defense to a capabilities-based planning and force-structuring model.²²

Fiscal constraints specifically do not conform to the definition of either the capabilities-based or threat-based models. There have been accusations of the military converting to a capacity-based force structure post-conflict, and recreating the hollow force trend, such as after Vietnam. As an example of an attempt to fix this issue, and an

²¹ The U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee Number three, Military Reserve Posture, 87th Congress, second session, August 17, 1962.

²² Michael E O’Hanlon, *Budgeting for Hard Power: Defense and Security Spending under Barack Obama*. (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 13.

example on the increased reliance on the Reserve Component, in a 2002 report for the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Thomas F. Hall reported:

There is a new defense strategy, which calls for a fresh examination of how active and reserve capabilities are organized. The “capabilities-based” approach replaced the “threat-based” approach of the previous decade. Rather than planning defenses according to who might threaten the United States, the Military Services are looking at how the country might be threatened. The new defense strategy also places more emphasis on Homeland Security. These changes in emphasis require a more flexible force than exists today—a force that is capable of dealing with many unknowns. The new strategy also calls into question the balance of capabilities within and between the Active and Reserve Components and whether changes are needed in how the Reserve Components are used.²³

In contrast, the U.S. still focuses on specific nation-states as world threats, such as China, North Korea, and Iran, even though the force-planning concepts are for a capabilities-based system. Both systems are incomplete when preparing for both the nation-state threats and the transnational ambiguous threats in the world.

In order to optimize this process and utilize the most appropriate planning tools, national military planners should determine the force structure based upon the threat, source it to capacity (build the necessary force structure), and compare the risks that are involved. According to these models, most often capabilities are driven by resource constraints. Changing capacity, in this case changing the overall amount of personnel, equipment and operations, to the level requiring changes in capabilities of the planned force structure, will force changes throughout the rest of the model, and one will have to assume more risk if there is a gap due to lost capabilities if they are not accounted for in

²³ The Office for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*, (Department of Defense, Washington D.C., 2002), viii.

the rest of the model.

Services Budgets

The National Security Act of 1947 reorganized the military and gave certain authorities to the new Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs over the Services, bringing them together under one Department.²⁴ Yet, each Service still ran their individual budget. Until 1962, each Service still submitted their individual budget to Congress for approval. According to the 2010 Department of Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process publication produced by the U.S. Army to educate senior officers:

When McNamara became the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in 1962, he brought with him expertise on how to control large organizations—the major tenet being the need to plan and program to control change over several years (i.e., multiyear programming). His management approach required each Service to document their multiyear programming of resources in a single document termed the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). He designated the SECDEF as the only approving authority for any changes to that document.²⁵

The DoD would submit one request to Congress, but each Service still maintained and executed its individual budget.

The Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986²⁶ added provisions for shared procurement. That meant two or more Services could share purchase orders, so that there was compatibility of equipment between Services in order

²⁴ The U.S. Congress, *The National Security Act of 1947*, Public Law 80-235, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947).

²⁵ PPBEPrimer_15_10_2010.doc, 2.
http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/files/primers/PPBEPrimer_15_10_2010.doc (accessed 16 April 2012)

²⁶ The U.S. Congress, *The Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 99th Congress, Public Law 99-433-Oct. 1, 1986, (Washington D.C., 1986), 1.

to work together, but they would purchase and receive individually owned Service equipment from that order. It allowed for shared ordering capability, in order to reap the benefits of buying in bulk, as well as compatible equipment, but continued with the tradition of not having shared budgets or shared ownership in individual equipment items between Services. Over the years since then, OSD has continually been the central management of Service Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution. This is directly related to the maturation of the Reserve Component (National Guard and Service Reserve entities) role as a major partner all the way to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Classically, military capability is considered in terms of four categories - readiness, force structure, modernization, and sustainability. The definition of readiness today is the ability of United States military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy.²⁷ A previous definition, which is clearer in terms of usage in this thesis, was the ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (including the ability to deploy an employee without unacceptable delays).²⁸ This definition provides more clarity to the imperatives and requirements that were listed for the Reserve Component in the RAND study twenty years ago. The RAND Reserve Component readiness strategy stated:

The strategy for Reserve Component training must be to achieve a satisfactory level of competency prior to mobilization. It is not necessary, in all cases, to train to the levels required for active forces. However, units and individuals must be sufficiently well trained that they can be brought up to required readiness in a reasonable time after mobilization. Otherwise, having them in the reserves may be neither cost-effective nor

²⁷ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office/electronic publication, 15 October 2010), 281.

²⁸ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office/electronic publication, 1 December 1989).

militarily prudent.²⁹

The Air Force Reserve Component, since this study was published, has transitioned from being a Strategic Reserve to being an Operational Reserve. The Air Force Reserve Component maintains the same readiness standards as the Air Force Active Component due to the continuation-training concept, instead of a “just-in-time” concept. Due to that change, the Air Force Reserve Component has greater involvement, responsibility, and a reduction in the total Air Force necessary, and will be further addressed in Chapter three. Increased readiness at a reduced cost in the Air Force, and the success of integrations is the example for adoption and proliferation throughout the Services, especially in an era of strategic level documents that demand greater inter-dependence.

Much has changed since the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, which sets the stage for new approaches, methods, and frameworks for force structure development, especially during times of great fiscal uncertainty.

²⁹ Lewis, Leslie, Robert Roll, and John Mayer, “Assessing the structure and mix of feature active and reserve forces: final report to the Secretary of Defense“, *RAND National Defense Research Institute* (Santa Monica, CA, 1992), 51-52.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Working to Create the Homogenous Whole

The following historical vignettes are the force structuring events leading up to the Vietnam and Desert Storm conflicts, through the outcomes of each, to include the Packard Commission and the Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Through the study of vignettes from these two major conflicts, the geo-political and economic conditions leading up to them, and the military postures throughout their eras, one can glean a better understanding of the recurring patterns in modern U.S. force structuring. Although one can view the cyclical nature of building forces for conflict, downsizing post-conflict, and the subsequent resulting hollow force resulting from reduction planning after both World War II and the Korean Conflict, the mix of forces utilized and the post-conflict threats developed during those eras are somewhat different. In today's situation, there are different types of threats in the world, increased interagency involvement requirements, and a myriad of Joint and Service advancements. A study of the changing military, geo-political, and economic environments in each case influenced and guided specific decision models. There were other models proposed by both DoD and Congressional officials, and declined by opposing officials, during those times. The vignettes of those decisions and events will show that some enacted ideas failed, others succeeded, and others not accepted had great validity. That validity still exists for many of the concepts, which are capable of application today, and are addressed as recommendations at the end of this thesis.

Pre- to Post- Vietnam

In 1958, the Reserve Component initiated restructuring into “pentomic” divisions. Those divisions were composed of five subordinate units, each with five subordinate units, with a capability of operating in both atomic and conventional battle arenas.¹ The Reserve Component role was traditionally reinforcement in a general mobilization for large-scale operations. This organizational structure seemed appropriate until the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced his desire to restructure the Reserve Component, and presented his plan to Congress.² In 1962, a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee initiated a study to verify the validity of the proposals by Secretary McNamara.³ This subcommittee’s recommendation was counter to the proposal by Secretary McNamara. The subcommittee stated the plan was crafted by Army planners who were more concerned with the issue of remaining within the resource constraints of the budget than with satisfying military readiness requirements.⁴

In 1964, Secretary McNamara again proposed a realignment of the Reserve Component, this time under the management of the National Guard, with a structure where the equipment purchases would be under the Active Component, with increased

¹ A. J. Basevich, *The Pentomic Era, The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (The National Defense University Press Publications, Washington D.C., 1986).

² Lewis, Leslie, Robert Roll, and John Mayer, *op cit.*, 30-31.

³ The U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee Number three, Military Reserve Posture, 87th Congress, second session, April 16, 1962, 5400.

⁴ The U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee Number three, Military Reserve Posture, 87th Congress, second session, August 17, 1962, 6670.

combat readiness and greater savings overall.⁵ He proposed eliminating units without equipment because “we could start from scratch, organize the divisions, recruit personnel, training the man in less time than it would take to produce and distribute the equipment.”⁶ Again, Congress denied Secretary McNamara’s attempt to bring the Reserve Component and Active Component into closer alignment.⁷ The Department of Defense desired a force capable of deploying and the civilian legislative counterparts were opposed to it.⁸

That sentiment on the political side continued as the Army planned for Vietnam with a large-scale Reserve Component mobilization (235,000 Army National Guard and Army reserve personnel).⁹ President Johnson decided against it and increased the monthly draft numbers from 17,000 to 35,000 instead.¹⁰ The reasons for not using the reserves goes out of an assertion that a reserve activation would transfer the burdens of deployment from the active forces to reserves, and to thousands of civilian communities and workplaces by removing critical community members, and the necessary expansion could be accomplished just as quickly by active forces with additional increased recruiting, and by creating new units.¹¹

After the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam and the Pueblo incident in Korea, the issue of reserve mobilization resurfaced and President Johnson authorized the activation

⁵ The U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee Number two, Merger of the Army Reserve Components, 89th Congress, first session, March 25. 1965, 3557 – 3559

⁶ Ibid., 3557 – 3559.

⁷ Ibid., 3561 – 3562.

⁸ Buchalter, Alice, and Seth Elan, “Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components”, *the Library of Congress* (Washington D.C., 2007).

⁹ Linden Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963 – 1969*, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1971), 145 – 146.

¹⁰ Crossland, Richard B. and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen: a History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908 – 1983*, *Office of the Chief, Army Reserve*, (Washington DC, 1984), 194.

¹¹ The U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, U.S. Army Combat Readiness, Hearings, 89th Congress, second session, 1966.

of 24,500 members of the National Guard and reserves on April 10, 1968.¹² Michael Doubler noted in his historical description of the Reserve Component performance in Vietnam, that the activated units did not meet their readiness requirements because nearly half of unit personnel were not fully trained or qualified and 17% were totally unqualified for their assigned positions. Doubler also concluded that there was no accurate readiness reporting system for the Reserve Components at that time.¹³ Due to such issues, the military developed the Chairman's Readiness System in 1994 to track readiness and identify any problems, which gradually grew into the Status of Readiness and Training System that we currently use.¹⁴

In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird enacted a change to the system. With increased demand for Defense budget cuts, reduction in Active Component forces and increased reliance on the Reserve Component, he proposed the Total Force Concept, where the Reserve Component would augment the Active Component forces.¹⁵ Secretary Laird stated "emphasis will be given to concurrent consideration of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat."¹⁶

After the abolition of the draft in 1973, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger stated, "The Total Force is no longer a concept. It is now the Total Force Policy which

¹² Michael D Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War – the Army National Guard, 1636 – 2000*, (Lawrence, Kansas: University press of Kansas, 2003), 259.

¹³ Lewis, Leslie, Robert Roll, and John Mayer, *op cit.*, 32.

¹⁴ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Guide 3401D, CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System* (Washington D.C.: The Government Printing Office, 14 November 2010).

¹⁵ The Secretary of Defense Melvin R Laird, Memorandum, Readiness of the Selected Reserves, (Department of Defense, August 21, 1970), 1-2.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

integrates the Active, Guard, and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole.”¹⁷ In an attempt to show greater reliance on the Reserve Component through an Active Component shift to the Reserve Component, there were large Active Component force reductions. Service issues emerged when there was not an adequate increase in the Reserve Component numbers (personnel, equipment, readiness, or any similar capability to those lost by the Active Component to meet the demands of the current mission). The result was a “hollow” force in which there was poor readiness in both components.¹⁸

Secretary Schlesinger reported there were limits to these substitutions of Reserve Component for Active Component forces. He stated, “If we are to act responsibly toward the National Guard and reserve, we should stop pretending that we can use all of them as full substitute for active-duty ground forces... Army and DoD revised estimates were that it would take at least 14 weeks after activation to deploy the eight Army National Guard divisions - with 10 of those weeks devoted to post-mobilization training”.¹⁹ In order to counter the decreased readiness issue Army Chief of Staff Gen. Creighton Abrams instituted the Roundout Concept. This included an addition of three regular divisions to the Army without increasing their active-duty manpower. The concept for implementation was that the Active Component would spread out and form three additional divisions out of their same base numbers, and then add the Reserve Component to those new, thin Active Component divisions to round out their numbers and capabilities. That meant the Reserve Component would be included and integrated

¹⁷ The Secretary of Defense James R Schlesinger, Memorandum, Readiness of the Selected Reserve, (Department of Defense, August 23, 1973), 1-2.

¹⁸ Buchalter, Alice, and Seth Elan, “Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components”, *the Library of Congress* (Washington D.C., 2007).

¹⁹ The Department of Defense, “Annual Report to the Congress, fiscal years 1976 and 1977” (Department of Defense, Washington D.C.), III-14.

into one third of the combat element of the divisions, effectively one third of the nation's ground fighting capability, instead of maintaining the previously separated and differing capabilities component concept.²⁰ This organizing technique produced four divisions from three new ones, with no changes to the total number of personnel in the Reserve Component, only a shift in the location of the manpower.²¹ The majority of the shift went to combat support missions. This gave a greater reliance on Active Component forces for the combat positions and a greater reliance on the Reserve Component forces for combat support positions, and alleviated the Active Component concerns about using Reserve Component forces for future contingencies.²²

As for other Services at that time, the Total Force Policy affected each Service differently. The Navy reported that for a full time forward presence they needed to favor the active rather than Reserve Component forces.²³ The Air Force, which started integrations in the mid to late 1960s even prior to the initiation of the Total Force Concept under Secretary Laird, reported acceptance of the ideology and that "the air National Guard and Air Force reserve have been fully integrated into the Total Air Force over the past eight years."²⁴

Civilians in the Vietnam Conflict

²⁰ The U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for fiscal year 1976 and 1977, Hearings, part two, 94th Congress, first session, 1975, 2091.

²¹ Ibid., 209.

²² Ibid., 2059 and 2144.

²³ Lewis, Leslie, Robert Roll, and John Mayer, *op cit.*, 35

²⁴ The U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for fiscal year 1976 and 1977, Hearings, part two, 94th Congress, first session, 1975, 2226.

Civilian organizations had previously worked in coordination with the military, but not to the level of integration that began in Vietnam. In 1967, the U.S. government started the Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later changed to Rural) Development Support program (CORDS). Under the one-war strategy program, civilian development efforts were integrated with the military efforts through a single chain of command in order to unify and provide a single vision for pacification operations, which had become the main effort in Vietnam.²⁵ This provided advisors, support, and funding from the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and others to develop infrastructure and to provide security.²⁶

In fact, civilians managed and supervised military personnel and resources as part of the formal command structure.²⁷ They were not only responsible for results in the field, as well as for the different agency reports, evaluations, inspections, and other administrative duties as required.²⁸ CORDS was able to increase security in South Vietnam villages almost twenty percent between 1968 and 1970 by placing manpower in the villages and centralizing efforts.²⁹ The greatest success of the CORDS program, though, was that it established effective interagency coordination and convinced the military to incorporate development operations into its overall security strategy.³⁰

²⁵ Robert M. Cassidy, "Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars", *Parameters*, Summer 2004, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/>, Summer 2004 (accessed 16 April, 2012).

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Andrade, Dale, and Colonel James H. Willbanks, "CORDS/PHOENIX Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future", *Small Wars Journal*, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/milreviewmarch2.pdf> (accessed 16 April, 2012).

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Frank Jones, "Blowtorch: Robert Komer", *Parameters*, Autumn 2005, 112. <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/articles/05autumn/jones.pdf> (accessed 16 April, 2012).

Although the program required great effort to create and sustain, it attained tremendous success and displayed a clear view of future inter-dependence. It is unfortunate that such a successful program was ignored after the conflict and not recognized as a benchmark capability.

The Packard Commission

In response to allegations of inappropriate oversight in July 1985, President Reagan created the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management to conduct an overall Defense management study.³¹ Also known as the Packard Commission, in recognition of its leader David Packard, its panel's task was to study and produce a report on the entire national security budget process, the Department of Defense (DoD) organization and command structure, the entire DoD procurement system, and government oversight and accountability programs.

Starting in 1981, President Reagan began a program of military expansion, both in capacity and capabilities, involving an increase in personnel and weapons procurement. During that time of prosperity and military expansion, the government was accused of lacking the appropriate levels of planning and oversight. There were further charges that the Reagan Administration accepted unreasonable expenditures for simple items as well as gross mismanagement of personnel.

As an integral part of the findings, the Commission reported that it was not criminal behavior that led to the unreasonable expenditures and mismanagement, but that

³¹ The U.S. President, *The President's Blue Ribbon Commission On Defense Management*, David Packard, (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1986).

costly problems were those of “overcomplicated organization and rigid procedure, not avarice or connivance”.³² The Commission made numerous recommendations in each of the listed categories, but one critical contribution was the recommendation for a follow-on study that became the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

The Goldwater Nichols Act

The Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, was enacted by President Ronald Reagan in 1986. The purpose of this law was:

To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility, to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning, to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.³³

The resulting reorganization brought unity of effort, integrated planning, shared procurement, and a reduction in inter-service rivalry. It also brought unity of command for war fighting purposes. Each Service converted from being a stove piped war-fighting organizations with distinct areas of expertise into training entities, responsible for

³² Ibid., xxiv.

³³ U.S. Congress, *The Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* (99th Congress, Public Law 99-433-Oct. 1, 1986, Washington D.C., 1986), 1.

training, manning, and equipping their forces for deployment as a component of an overall integrated force. Under this structure, a unified combatant command would be assigned air, ground, and naval assets from the appropriate Services to maximize efficiency in achieving its objective. This was intended to rectify the inefficient method of individual Services planning, supporting, and fighting the same war in a disjointed manner that had been the case previously. In addition to those improvements, the law realigned the overall military chain of command. It redirected its flow from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, directly to unified combatant commanders, completely bypassing the Service chiefs and separating operations channels from the force generation channels.

Another efficiency sought by this law was shared procurement. This allowed the various branches to share advances in technology and the benefits of common usage such as the utilization of the same radios between Services. The joint interoperability advances led to the need and development of supporting Joint doctrine. The first step was to meet the need for common training and language. Such changes caused regular assignments of members of individual Services to Joint Duty positions and education in DoD Joint professional military education (JPME) schools to be part of career development and progression.

As a result, the Services have become more integrated and reliant on each other. The law called for a policy directing Total Force initiatives and greater inter-dependence on each other.

Pre- to Post- Desert Storm Conflict

In 1992, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin warned the U.S. House of Representatives: “Desert Storm was a perfect war with the perfect enemy... We had the perfect coalition, the perfect infrastructure, and the perfect battlefield. We should be careful about the lessons we draw from the war.”³⁴ As successful as the Desert Storm was, there are still many lessons to learn from it today.

The ideology behind the design of the structure for the military at the onset of Desert Storm was to counter the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other Soviet type threats, primarily using the Active Component forces for fighting and Reserve Component forces for support. In 1990, the Army had twenty-eight combat divisions and twenty-eight separate combat brigades. There were eighteen Active Component and ten Reserve Component combat divisions, as well as five Active Component and twenty-three separate Reserve Component combat brigades. The Active Component forces were for forward-deployment, contingencies, and rapid reinforcement. The Reserve Component forces made up more than fifty percent of the Army. They also made up more than sixty percent of the support units.³⁵ For the first time, this made the Reserve Component not only an integral part, but also absolutely critical to the deployment and follow-on sustainment of the Active Component forces.

The Marine Corps had three Active Component divisions and one Reserve Component division, aircraft wings, and support elements for usage in three Marine

³⁴ Les Aspin, *Defense For a New Era, Lessons of the Gulf War* (House Committee on Armed Services, Washington D.C., 1992), 3.

³⁵ The U.S. Center of Military History, *Structuring the Force: the Army and Total Force Policy*, Department of the Army Historical Summary FY 1990-1991, 104.
<http://www.history.army.mil/books/DAHSUM/1990-91/ch08.htm>. (accessed 16 April 2012).

expeditionary forces. Air Force tactical air forces had more than 36 tactical fighter wings, 24 Active Component and 12 Reserve Component, each equipped with 72 combat aircraft, as well as additional reconnaissance, support, and warning and control aircraft. The Navy maintained 13 active and two reserve carrier air wings composed of a mix of combat and support aircraft. Naval forces contained fourteen carrier battle groups, two battleship surface action groups, and ten underway replenishment groups.³⁶ These total forces were smaller than those during previous conflicts and depended heavily on the Reserve Component.

The Services differed in their respective Reserve Component construct. The Marine Corps Reserve structure was almost a mirror of active forces so that Reserve Component units could easily augment and reinforce a Marine Air Ground Task Force. The Marines had the ability to exhaust the active forces before the mandatory activation of the reserves. The Air Force had more than half of the total airlift and much of the air refueling and maintenance capability in the Reserve Component.³⁷ The Navy mainly needed reservists to support the Military Sealift Command.³⁸

The Army had over 50% of combat forces and 67% of aggregate combat support and combat service support units in the Reserve Components. Certain functions, like civil affairs, supply, and services, more than 95% were in the Reserve Component, which necessitated early activation for contingencies requiring large forces.³⁹ In addition, the Army had support for port operations, military police companies, military intelligence units, and water purification and communication skills mainly in the Reserve Component.

³⁶ Richard Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Department of Defense, Washington D.C., January 1990), .3

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 44.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 44.

³⁹ Lewis, Leslie, Robert Roll, and John Mayer, *op cit.*, 42-43.

The Total Force structure in 1990 was designed, built, trained, and equipped to fight the Soviet Union in a global war. The increased reliance on the Reserve Component meant that early activations of certain reserve units, especially support units, would be necessary to meet the requirements of a contingency.⁴⁰

Congressional involvement further guided the increased reliance on and the specific types of units in the Reserve Component. The Fiscal Year 1991 Defense Authorization Act recommended active-duty forces “be able to deploy rapidly to trouble spots and to sustain themselves for the first 30 days with virtually no support from the Reserve Components”.⁴¹ Following this guidance, the Active Component forces would initiate the deployment and continue through the utilization of Reserve Component Roundout brigades. The guidance also recommended that Active Component and Reserve Component forces complement each other rather than maintain identical units.⁴² The idea was to continue reductions in overall capacity (personnel, equipment, and infrastructure) by becoming more integrated and efficient.

Even though the Reserve Component became more integrated and grew in its responsibilities as an integral part of the deploying Active Component forces, the activation of the Reserve Component forces was slow at the onset of Desert Shield in early 1990. When the United States proposed a protection plan for Saudi Arabia after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, the pace of mobilization and deployment of forces picked up dramatically. Initially the Reserve Component was limited to combat support and combat service support forces.⁴³ The August call up of 48,800 reservists was for minimum

⁴⁰ Ibid., 42.

⁴¹ The U.S. Center of Military History, *op cit.*, 104.

⁴² Ibid., 104.

⁴³ Michael D Doubler, *op cit.*, 312.

essential augmentation, limited only to the essential personnel needed to run the deployment processes for the deploying Active Component forces.⁴⁴ In November 1990, when the operations posture shifted from defensive to offensive, three Army National Guard Roundout brigades mobilized.⁴⁵ The Air Force activated three Air Reserve Component combat squadrons and the Marine Corps called the key combat elements of the Fourth Marine division, bringing the total number of Reserve Component personnel on active duty to 180,000.⁴⁶ After the first day of battle for Operation Desert Storm, January 18, 1991, President Bush mobilized almost one million total Reserve Component members for two years.⁴⁷ With that authority, the Secretary of Defense authorized the activation of the additional 360,000 Reserve Component members.⁴⁸ Although so many mobilized, not all deployed, and the Army did not send the three initial Army National Guard Roundout brigades to the conflict.⁴⁹

Considerable criticism (from Congress and the media) addressed the ineffectiveness of the Reserve Component and overreliance on end effectiveness of the Reserve Component forces during Desert Storm. This primarily was based on the Roundout Brigade decision. Specifically, there was a decision by the Army not to deploy the Roundout Brigades for Operation Desert Storm. The FY 1991 Defense Authorization Act Total Force Policy Report, and reports of inadequate readiness from the Army led to the decision to abandon the Roundout Brigade concept.⁵⁰

⁴⁴ Lewis, Leslie, Robert Roll, and John Mayer, *op cit.*, 45.

⁴⁵ Michael D Doubler, *op cit.*, 313.

⁴⁶ Lewis, Leslie, Robert Roll, and John Mayer, *op cit.*, 48-49.

⁴⁷ Michael D Doubler, *op cit.*, 318.

⁴⁸ Lewis, Leslie, Robert Roll, and John Mayer, *op cit.*, 50.

⁴⁹ Michael D Doubler, *op cit.*, 2003), 332.

⁵⁰ Buchalter, Alice, and Seth Elan, "Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components", *the Library of Congress* (Washington D.C., 2007), 19.

Even though the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard troops displayed inadequate readiness during Operation Desert Storm, the Reserve Component forces as a whole, and those with service in combat, validated the Total Force Policy of the DoD.⁵¹ Two Reserve Component field artillery brigades, 142nd of Arkansas and the 196th of Tennessee, and sustainment support provided by Reserve Component combat support and combat service support units in the Persian Gulf War were examples of success.⁵² Specifically in reference to the Air Reserve Component, “Reserve units, air crews, maintenance crews and support personnel required little to no post-mobilization training before performing their respective missions. All activated reserve flying units mobilized in 24 hours and less were prepared to deploy or did deploy in less than 72 hours.”⁵³ It was of particular note that when there was an activation of Reserve Component forces, the readiness levels were sufficient to ensure mission accomplishment with a minimum of post-mobilization training.⁵⁴

Under Total Force Policy, the purpose for the Reserve Component was to augment the Active Component in contingencies, and planners assumed that in times of war there would be abundant and rapid mobilization of reserve forces.⁵⁵ A RAND report to the SecDef found the following:

Judged by the criteria of available and ready forces, Total Force Policy was effective during the Persian Gulf conflict. Specifically, the required number and type of reserve units and individuals needed were available.

⁵¹ The U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, Reserve and Guard Effectiveness, 103rd Congress, first session, April 20, 1993.

⁵² The U.S. Center of Military History, *op cit.*, 104.

⁵³ Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: April 1992), H-15.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, H-22.

⁵⁵ Lewis, Leslie, Robert Roll, and John Mayer, *op cit.*, 40.

The vast majority that was called were ready to deploy with minimal or no post-mobilization training.⁵⁶

Those noted successes led to further Active Component reliance on and interdependence of the Reserve Component. After Operation Desert Storm, the Army discussed the need to adjust the Total Force Policy due to specific observations, which included no longer having the requirement to maintain the abundance of ready forces for rapid deployment to Europe, the potential demand for immediate deployment anywhere else in the world, a reduced Active Component that would need to rely on the Reserve Component to reinforce extended operations for concurrent second major contingencies and for large scale threats, and the reduced Soviet threat that allowed for longer U.S. force generation timeframes.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Congress sounded a cautionary note to those who plan for contingency operations, both authorizers and appropriators were clear, “We plan to support military contingencies with guard and reserve units and manpower when they can be available and ready within planned deployment schedules.”⁵⁸

The Army intended to reduce, over several years, both the Active and Reserve Components to be a smaller and equally capable Total Force. Accordingly, General Colin Powell, as the CJCS, introduced the “base force” concept. Under this concept, the definition of “base force” was the minimum troop levels required among all of the uniformed Services that still allowed the U.S. to maintain its superpower status and to meet worldwide responsibilities.⁵⁹ It was inevitable that larger cuts would come.

⁵⁶ Lewis, Leslie, Robert Roll, and John Mayer, *op cit.*, 40.

⁵⁷ The U.S. Center of Military History, *op cit.*, 104.

⁵⁸ National Defense authorization act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993, report 102 – 114, US Senate committee on armed services, 202.

⁵⁹ Michael D Doubler, *op cit.*, 335.

Civilians in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

The role of the civilian workforce before, during, and after Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was different from that of the civilian workforce for the Vietnam conflict. The two major differences were that the civilian workforce for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm did not work reconstruction and stabilization internal to Iraq (the priority in the reconstruction and stabilization efforts was the country of Kuwait), and there was not a large-scale counterinsurgency operation for Iraq like in Vietnam. Those two differences between the operations, and their means of prosecution, were the reasons for the different interagency offices involved and the level of use of supporting civilians.

Deploying civilians into the combat area for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was based upon the Army's Air Land Battle doctrine which required high-intensity/high-speed combat and the logistics support to maintain that intensity and speed. Prior conflicts had used military channels and personnel for the critical logistic burden. As Frederick the Great stated in 1774, "without supplies, no army is brave".⁶⁰ Logistics support is an integral part of the campaign plan and factored in as a primary component of combat power.⁶¹ There was a shift in support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, resulting in the need for large numbers (the majority) of the civilians deploying in order to fulfill the logistical support needs of the Army. It is of note that the Army Materiel Command and the Corps of Engineers were responsible for the majority of the

⁶⁰ Frederick II of Prussia, The King of Prussia's Military Instruction to his Generals, 1747, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/fred_instructions.htm (accessed 16 April 2012).

⁶¹ Craig A. Simonds, The Role of Civilians During the First Gulf War by Craig A. Simonds, <http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb04/RoleofCivilians.htm> (accessed 16 April 2012).

Combat Support and Combat Service Support performed by civilians (both civil servants and contractors).⁶² For these operations, thousands of logisticians were deployed at every level of military command (over 1,600 were civilians), and more than 1,000 civilians from the Depot System Command set up major depot operations, while other Army Materiel Command (AMC) Civil Service employees purchased, transported, and maintained supplies, materiel, and spare parts; painted M1A1 tanks; designed mine rakes and "Bunker Busters" (a 5,000 pound bomb specifically built to penetrate 22 feet of concrete); established and operated water purification and distribution systems; and provided technical assistance on weapons and equipment.⁶³ The deployed civilians, both Army Civil Service employees and independent contractors, were the linchpin in enabling the rapid movement and maneuver of the aggressive fighting forces.

Army civilian employees will continue to be a critical component in supporting logistical operations. Modern conflicts show that the logistical operations are more complex than the tactical operations and demand a higher understanding of the entire campaign.⁶⁴ Logistics involves having enough materiel, having the right materiel, and delivering it at the right place and time. A U.S. Army division has a high consumption rate and is limited in battle by sustainability and replenishment, which time and distance factors further challenge due to the battlefield dimensional changes as combat progresses.⁶⁵ Logistics and the need for civilian support at all levels (independent

⁶² Melinda K. Darby, "CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTIONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD BY MELINDA K. DARBY" (United States Department of Army Civilian, USAWC 1993), 8.

⁶³ Craig A. Simonds, *op cit.*

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

contractors, Federal Civil Service employees, and specifically, DoD Civil Service employees) have both grown and accelerated since Desert Storm.⁶⁶

The main focus for reconstruction and stabilization operations was on Kuwait, and, although there was high praise for the accomplishments of the task force assigned to those duties, in addition to proving it was highly effective in coordinating a large Whole-of-Government action, the response to the Kuwaiti Government's request for planning assistance took months.⁶⁷ In addition, there was scrutiny of the task force's planning process for operating completely separately from CENTCOM's preparation of war plans.⁶⁸ It is also of note that the majority of the force was from the military component, and "of the total 4,808 AC/RC US Civil Affairs personnel available, 43% (or 2083) were deployed during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM".⁶⁹

Clearly, Civil Affairs was a mission element that did not initially work well. Most units did not know what to do with their attached Civil Affairs (CA) units, many Army officers were the most ignorant or negligent in utilization of assigned CA units, and those CA units arriving in Saudi Arabia found that their assigned supporting units often did not even know they were coming.⁷⁰ Later, though, CA units were some of the first U.S. personnel to enter Kuwait and were able to accomplish most of their essential tasks. It can be greatly attributed to the task force's effective planning efforts, not to appropriate

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ John R. Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq" (Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991), 63.

⁶⁸ John R. Brinkerhoff, *op cit.*, 63.

⁶⁹ Eric Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Desert Shield/Storm" *Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.*, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090129_desert_shield_desert_storm_study.pdf (accessed 16 April 2012).

⁷⁰ Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991*. (U.S. Army Special Operations Command History and Archives Division, 1993), 401.

use of Civil Affairs units, that no public health crises arose, that between 33%-50% of electrical power had been restored by March(within two months), and that the transportation and telecommunications systems were much improved.⁷¹ The final outcome for Kuwait was extremely positive, and reconstruction was rapid. Yet, there was no reconstruction effort for Iraq, Civil Affairs or otherwise, and the outcome was not as positive. This was primarily due to the exclusion of Iraqi reconstruction efforts in the defined end-state given to the operation by President Bush, which led to more than ten years of sanctions and security issues, a very different issue than that presented here.

Through the study of these vignettes from the last two major conflicts, the geopolitical and economic conditions leading up to them, and the military postures throughout their timeframes, one can gain a better understanding of the recurring patterns in modern U.S. force structuring. In addition, there were several examples of courses of action leading to successful integration and interdependence between governmental agencies, among different Services, and also between Active Component and Reserve Component forces. This chapter also showed why those choices were made, the reasoning behind the decisions, and why those choices are still valid for inclusion this research.

⁷¹ John R. Brinkerhoff, *op cit.*, 49-50.

CHAPTER 3: ACHIEVING BALANCE

Through exploring methods of achieving balance, multiple avenues become apparent to maintain our capability requirements while continuing to reduce our overall capacity, working prudently to prevent actualizing a “hollow force”. This chapter begins with the concept of optimizing balances of the three cornerstones of force structuring: manpower, equipment, and operations. It then moves to maintaining capability and gaining overall readiness while reducing costs. This is done by having the appropriate type of training for the Reserve Component. Specifically, the research compares “just-in time” to “continuation” training. Finally, the chapter concludes with suggested ways to optimize force structure planning by using various integration techniques and by going so far as supporting the philosophy of reengineering major portions of the federal government.

Manpower, Equipment, and Operations

The period after the Korea and Vietnam conflicts brought reductions in both budget and capacity of the military, as discussed in chapter two. The government anticipated an era of peace and risked repercussions from the reductions in the force structure. Both reduction methods naturally strive to achieve improved savings, efficiency and effectiveness, and combat improvements through force structure changes. As a result, overall operations diminished to the point of negative outcomes. Current readiness suffered, and lead to a “hollow force”. The reductions in the budget also

produced a procurement holiday, or a modernization hiatus. In peace, the force appeared to be capable and ready, but, as new threats emerged, the weakness of the force became apparent.

Strategy normally drives decisions on both spending increases and reductions. In the case of reductions, if they are steep enough, it is possible to push strategy in an undesirable direction by the combination of spending reductions and potential increased threats. For example, the increase in nuclear capabilities to alleviate more expensive increased general-purpose forces. Nevertheless, it seems that the Department of Defense would continuously look to all areas to achieve more savings, even during a procurement holiday. One could reasonably expect major reduction elements to include efficiencies, personnel costs, reductions in operations and operational exercises, and modernization and procurement.

While it may be possible to make reductions in personnel, procurement, and/or operations, there are pitfalls in cutting any one of these in an isolated manner. For example, in occasions of reductions only in personnel, the intent may be a decrease in overall manpower, while equipment and operations stay the same. This may theoretically produce a reduction in overall personnel numbers and costs while maintaining the same quality of the force. The challenge, then, is to maintain capabilities under changes in requirements today and in the future demand. In a similar manner, when there is a reduction only in procurement, the personnel numbers remain the same, current readiness remains the same, but there is a constantly degraded equipment base and a decrease in future upgrades. Theoretically, there may be savings on the equipment, but one could remain stuck in the present, which will too rapidly become the past. Thus, not only is

there no accounting for today's capability gaps, but also one will not be able to mitigate emerging capability gaps or any large surge requirements. When there is a reduction only in operations, the personnel numbers remain the same, equipment stays the same, and there is a decrease in current readiness. There may theoretically be greater reliance on deterrence. The downfall then comes from the challenges of generating forces when there is an immediate emerging threat situation that would require new equipment or a new approach.

Complications increase as joint capabilities become the focus. A shift can be made in the overall force structure through actions like: (1) reducing the Reserve Component and increasing the Active Component; (2) reducing the Active Component and increasing the Reserve Component; (3) increasing joint activities; or (4) multiple other combinations. Using the Reserve Component in peacetime to deter a threat and maintain a capability is less costly in personnel than using Active Component, but the equipment cost is still the same. Using the Active Component instead of a Reserve Component unit maintains a full-time capability, the same equipment cost, more full-time manpower and support costs, but a reduction in overall base operational support costs (if the Reserve Component uses "just-in-time" training concepts). An increase in joint activities will decrease both equipment and personnel costs for one single Service, while still maintaining that capability for that Service. A joint option also eliminates full size duplication among the Services. The downside here is that one Service may dominate and another Service may to lose its entire competency in that mission. At the tactical level, completely integrated maintenance capabilities would also require more work and training for an individual Service to learn the nuances of the other Services (both good

and bad). There are issues of non-standard language, jargon, acronyms, procedures, doctrine, training levels, tactics, etc. All of that is exponentially accentuated when the joint concept expands to coalition or inter-agency operations.

The threat of reduction always exists. It is obvious that the quest for reductions is constant and consistent. The question remains as to the most appropriate source for such reductions or reprogramming. In addition to the physical location, when there is a specific reduction choice, the process to be employed needs to be identified, as well as when and how to implement. The decision also needs to be made whether a capability remain single service-internal, convert to Joint multi-service, convert to Joint multi-agency, or convert to coalition based. Whether it is a balancing or a rebalancing, a combination of the methods listed above is optimal.

The combinations must be focused through a plan with an overall vision and direction. It all begins with the end state (which is the final vision, direction, and required capabilities) and works backward to the present capabilities. Planning provides a structured path to the end state, based on requirements. The capabilities and the requirements will then equate to necessary resources.

Such vectors can also work in the other direction, if necessary. As resource funding fluctuates, and potential threats do not change, a comprehensive review of desired capabilities will point to the most prudent choices in funding requirements. As long as the base infrastructure remains, there is room to contract or expand as necessary. One method may be to maintain a training foundation in the infrastructure to sustain long-term resilience to help respond to the expansions and contractions that accompany budget fluctuations.

Even before the January 2012 proposed Congressional reduction of \$487 Billion over the 2012-2022 budgets, analysts were discussing the already weakened force.

The combination of increased deployment, reduced force structure, and underfunded procurement is causing a decline in America's military capability. The Navy has fewer ships than at any time since 1916. The Air Force inventory is smaller and older than at any time since the Service came into being in 1947. The Army has missed several generations of modernization, and many of its soldiers are on their fourth or fifth tour of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan. The Reserves have been on constant mobilization; many vital programs cut, such as missile defense; and in the past two years, no fewer than 50 modernization programs ended.¹

Before the cuts, reductions, and replacements begin, at least three different inquiries need to be accomplished. The first is a comprehensive examination of all current capabilities in all of the Services. It is simply identifying every capability the U.S. military currently possess. It covers what is in each individual Service, Joint, on loan to other organizations, etc. This will involve combining and analyzing the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Capability Gap Assessment, Strategic Guidance Statements, individual Service capability databases, etc.

Next, the planning team needs to identify total future capability requirements in all of the Services (more comprehensive and inclusive than current processes like the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and so forth). This involves applying strategy to potential threats and risk mitigation as previously stated. It is the final product of identified future capabilities requirements, and will be the appropriate end state as a final force structure posture. Then, overall joint services work group inquiry is required to

¹ Jim Talent, "Keeping Our Military Strong" (Heritage Organization, May 2, 2011), <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/america-at-risk-keeping-our-military-strong> (accessed 16 April 2012).

identify how to optimize those capabilities requirements. A future step would be to include other agencies and coalition partners.

This is where the balancing begins. Specific conditions lead to optimally utilized capabilities. Some optimization is internal to a single Service and not integrated. This means they are contained as a traditional non-integrated unit in the strictest sense, as most units are today. Other optimization will occur such as integrated units.

Integration may be internal to the Services, between governmental agencies and departments, and possibly even coalition entities. Single Service internal integrations involve active duty units integrating with Reserve Component units, or between Reserve Component units (National Guard and Reserve). There are numerous integrated units throughout the Services today. Some successful Air Force examples include: the integrations between the Active Duty Air Force 436th and Air Force Reserve 512th Airlift Wings (AC to RC) at Dover, Delaware, between the Wyoming Air National Guard and the Active Duty Air Force (RC to AC) in the 153rd Airlift Wing at Cheyenne, Wyoming, between the Air Force Reserve and the Active Duty Air Force (RC to AC) in the 440th Airlift Wing at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and between the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard (RC to RC) at the 914th Airlift Wing at Buffalo, New York. Joint Service integrations will be between at least two different Service components. This presently happens in limited occasions for operational reasons, mostly overseas, but not for everyday unit equipping and training. Joint governmental agency or departmental integrations may be internal to a department (like one of the Services in DoD and the Defense Intelligence Agency), or between at least two different departments or agencies.

The integrations may go as far as being coalition based. An example of this might be assigning a foreign flying squadron to a U.S. carrier group or vice versa.

Obvious issues for such actions include funding and equipping, doctrine and publications, discipline and performance appraisals, etc. There is no doubt that many members in the Services will resist such integration proposals. However, there are numerous current successful integrations in the Air Force. There are also successful intra-service integrations in the British Services. While such issues require resolution, the alternative is to lose certain capabilities along with expertise in that Service component.

Just-In-Time Versus Continuation Training

“Just-in-time” training is the rapid completion of wartime skills training required prior to deployments throughout the world for units that do not maintain a continuous state of CJCS Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reportable defined readiness. Also, there is a difference between “just-in-time” training units and “continuation” training units in the Reserve Component (RC). “Just-in-time” training units have minimal training during the year (roughly two days a month and a two-week annual training requirement). The majority of the listed training drills involve only basic skills and administrative functions. Such training relies heavily on a spool-up period for deployments in order to get the training required for that deployment, hence the “just-in-time” descriptor. Cost and time delays are often experienced in such spool-up periods”. Yet, the added potential and manpower base cost relatively little in comparison to the Active Component (AC) manpower costs. Deployment costs should be the same, and

deployment periods are currently the same for all components, no matter who goes, but there are added training costs in the spool-up period. There is also a loss of or degradation in expertise and skills. The concept of “just-in-time” should apply to units that are relied upon to maintain a regeneration capability for rapid increases in total number of personnel, and easily trained or retrained skills. As a practical matter, this may be a small cost if it prevents the need for conscription.

The Reserve Component “continuation” training units have the same response time as equivalent Active Component units, therefore they must train year round. Such units stay ready the entire year, and maintain the same training requirements as the AC counterparts, which makes them interchangeable with the AC units for deployments. There is no spool-up time requirement and no loss of expertise for the skills in these units. They only incur costs when training, which is more than the “just-in-time” units, but significantly less than the AC units. They are of the same value to the combatant commanders, but are at a reduced cost to the Services. They are the units that should be relied upon the most to maintain readiness and capabilities, which is valid under any budget condition.

It needs to be noted that the AC units, while incurring all of the full-time costs, are manned and trained full-time to deploy anywhere in minimal time, obviating additional costs, or time, involved in getting AC units ready for deployments. The Active Component consistently groom their expertise. Finally, there may be deterrence in the numbers and response time when considered by potential adversaries.

Reengineering to Achieve Balance

In order to achieve balance, and prevent a “hollow force”, the U.S. needs to reengineer not just in the Department of Defense, but also beyond the DoD to the government as a whole. This section of the chapter pursues actions that are required to make possible the required changes to reengineer the DoD, and possibly other departments and agencies, in order to sustain agility for the future.

According to Samuel P. Huntington,

The principal responsibility of Western leaders, consequently, is not to attempt to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West, which is beyond their declining power, but to preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization. Because it is the most powerful Western country, that responsibility falls overwhelmingly on the United States of America.²

One may conclude that, in such a case, the United States is in an era of increasing interdependence among its own governmental agencies and departments, and nearly constant internal changes as well. Therefore, transformation at all levels of the government is imperative, if the U.S. is to maintain its Super Power status.

In this transformation, the national security system needs to undergo a complete reengineering. Reengineering, according to Hammer and Champy, is the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance.³ Trying become leaner with the current processes, systems, etc. may, in the judgement of the author, lead to ineffective processes or error. Reengineering requires holistic cogitation resulting in transformation due to

² Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon and Schuster, New York, NY, 1996), 311.

³ Hammer, M., and J. Champy, *Reengineering the corporation: A manifesto for business revolution* (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 35.

numerous instances of combining several jobs into one, with fewer people working (resulting in the decision cycle movement to lower levels), with far less duplication among the Services and agencies (so the processes will apply where they make the most sense); and, with decentralized functions.

Through reengineering, tasks change to become multidimensional, personnel are empowered at lower levels, there is more emphasis on education, performance measures are enacted to focus on results rather than activities, promotions are based more on ability and past performance, each organizational structure becomes less hierarchical and flatter, and leadership needs to be prevalent throughout.⁴

The success of the transformation will rely on changing processes entirely instead of fixing or modifying the previous processes. It will force a total redesign of the departments, organizations, and agencies where they overlap or are involved. One cannot allow strong beliefs in any single entity to lead to the effect of settling for minor results or stop in the middle of change. Since there will be new processes, one cannot allow previous constraints or existing cultures to impede progress. Ideally, the effort needs to be applied as widely as possible in accordance with a Whole-of-Government philosophy.

Initiated at the top, and permeating through several departments, reengineering will require clear vision and understanding from the leaders, as well as education of those throughout who will implement. Top leaders will have to be able to think both deductively and inductively to resolve the complex reengineering issues. Thinking deductively involves defining a problem then seeking and evaluating different solutions to it. Thinking inductively initially involves the ability to recognize the powerful solution

⁴ Hammer, M., and J. Champy, *op cit.*, 72-84.

and then seeking the problems it might solve.⁵ The final product is less likely to be a simple improvement than to be a completely new structure. Again, it is imperative to monitor and subdue departmental resistance because certain departments will experience loss. It is equally important to monitor the specific personnel involved in the changes to ensure personal resistance does not impede progress.

Detailed reengineering in the National Security Profession is too broad a subject for this research, but brief consideration is appropriate for context. There must be progression past simply equating requirements with resources. Each Service, department, agency, and bureau has individual lists of requirements and resources, with several separate budgets feeding the process. There are inefficiencies and redundancies throughout the U.S. government. The resources, efforts, and operations are so dispersed and weakened by limited resources and expertise that the concept of a “hollow force” permeates throughout the entire government, not just the military. This will be abundantly apparent as the other agencies assume previous military missions with no increase to their manpower. The plan of action for balance, due to the increasing interdependence between organizations, needs to include options elsewhere in the federal government, as well as possible coalition options.

Before breaking down the myriad of integration types, it is important to discuss the nuances of integrations. The definition of integration in Joint Publication 1-02 is the “synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander's force prior to mission

⁵ Hammer, M., and J. Champy, *op cit.*, 88.

execution”, as well as the “arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole”.⁶

Some of the advantages to organizations that are integrated organizationally are they use the same equipment, they speak the same language, and a single effort providing greater efficiency and interoperability is much more readily achieved. Multiple units are likely to maximize usage of a singular equipment purchase, terminology and acronyms become common through shared doctrine and training plans, and shared missions and operations are commonplace.

Integrated organizations, as a whole, require less equipment, less manpower, and less overhead support resulting in lower overall cost. Due to sharing the equipment, requiring less total equipment purchases, each single organization can reduce total personnel. This is due to efficiencies of added members from other agencies or Services, and the overhead support can reduce to one single set of management and support staff for multiple combined units.

Some of the disadvantages involve not having a single budget, not having adequate doctrine in place, the requirement to have complete buy-in and necessary compromises, loss of individual Service control and freedom, and the loss of some specialties. Each Service and agency has their own budget, and there is not any type of a combined budget yet. So the integrated organizations will have to seek money from numerous sources that may not see them as a priority. The current doctrine is limited for peacetime training and non-operational integrations, and the contingency-based doctrine does not apply in those instances. Therefore, there may be a requirement for the creation

⁶ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, Joint Operations* (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office/electronic publication, 15 October 2010), 179.

and implementation of new doctrine to cover the proposed changes. Buy-in and effective compromises from parent organizations must exist, lest there will not be a single vision causing competing priorities to undermine the commander of the integrated organization. Buy-in and effective compromises are also necessary for adequate training plans, common language, tactics, etc. The parent Services and agencies will experience some loss of control and internal flexibility due to the compromises and cooperation necessary for the overall success. Finally, by combining units, reducing overhead and manpower, and making necessary adjustments to integrate similar mission-type units, the risk is reduced and likelihood of success is increased.

The U.S. military has made great progress through joint doctrine and organizations. The current joint organization places the Service chiefs in their positions on the Joint Chiefs of Staff under one CJCS. They advise both the President and the CJCS, as well as run their respective Service. The CJCS advises both the President and the SecDef, as previously stated. The individual Services, the JCS, the CJCS, the unified commanders, and those assigned to unified commands, are under one secretary in the Department of Defense. This allows for unified vision, effectiveness, and efficiency. Although there is still separation of the Service budgets, the total defense budget is modified, coordinated, submitted, and distributed through the DoD. There is overall direction and vision for integrating units from different Services for unity of effort and command in operational environments. The type and level of coordination for operational missions is across the different Services and functions. This minimizes duplication of effort, coordinates to prevent accidents, and conserves resources. Progress to this stage

has taken many years (refining common terms, common coordinating systems, common education, and so on), and great efforts by the Services.

To be more specific, the military reformed with the National Security Act of 1947 in order to bring individual military Services together, and then became further integrated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Each Act reorganized the military and provided greater efficiency through specific integrations. The National Security Act of 1947 established one coordinated effort at the top, and revised the leadership structure. The Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 brought together the Services at a much lower level of integration to provide efficiencies throughout the entire Department of Defense.

According to multiple sources, authors such as Martin J. Gorman and Alexander Krongard, Joel Bagnal suggest there needs to be similar reorganization and reform if we are to achieve similar levels of integration, efficiency, and unity of effort in national policy.⁷ The governmental inter-agency offices came together in a small-scale integration under CORDS in Vietnam. There was great success, due to immense internal efforts, with this inter-agency integration. Yet, the U.S. did not perpetuate the success, CORDS was smaller in national scale, and the integration disbanded after the Vietnam conflict.

Regarding coordination of efforts at the national level, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell stated “Military success alone will not be sufficient to prevail in this environment. To confront the challenges before us, we must strengthen the capacity of

⁷ Gorman, Martin J. and Alexander Krongard, “A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process” (*Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 39, 2005), 51. Bagnal, Joel, “Goldwater-Nichols for the Executive Branch: Achieving Unity of Effort, Threats at Our Threshold” (*Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 2006 Convention).

the other elements of national power, leveraging the full potential of our interagency partners”.⁸

Figure 7 below references the relationships for Homeland Defense and Civil Support of the military in Joint Publication 3-28.⁹ This Joint Publication used in the DoD defines the overall military roles of support and supporting under specified conditions and missions, but more importantly, it clearly demonstrates DoD’s inter-dependence with the other Federal Departments and Agencies. If the DoD builds an appropriate force structure in relation to “supported” and “supporting” roles respectively, embracing the inter-dependence with other Federal Agencies, and instead of attempting to provide resources to cover everything alone, it may achieve extensive budgetary savings as well as provide greater vision and focus to prevent a “hollow force”.

⁸ Lt Gen William B. Caldwell IV, Commander, U.S. Army combined arms Center, *Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations* (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2008).

⁹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office/Electronic Publications, 14 September 2007), I-4.




Figure 7¹⁰

The case of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is worthy of consideration as there was limited integration and reform in the development of DHS. Although multiple agencies were moved to become part of the department (moved so that DHS would have control of that entity and program), the actual integration with other departments and agencies is still lacking. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also provided integration amongst departments and agencies.¹¹ The National Strategy for Counter Terrorism utilizes a coordinated effort between the Central

¹⁰ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office/Electronic Publications, 14 September 2007), I-4.

¹¹ The U.S. Congress, *The Intelligence Reform And Terrorism Prevention Act*, Public Law 108-458, 17 December 2004. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004.

Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the military, and others.¹² The Bureau for Reconstruction and Stabilization is under Department of State, but depends upon the military for manpower and security.¹³ Combating Transnational Criminal Organizations requires integrated solutions between all law enforcement agencies and the military.¹⁴

In order to counter transnational crime, terrorism, and insurgencies effectively, the U.S. needs to come together at the national, as well as the lower levels for adequate solutions. The federal government may not be ready for a Goldwater Nichols Reorganization Act part II for inter-agency reformation, but it is imperative that we at least progress to the combining of national policy efforts with a focus on strategies to combat threats to national security. Thus, the federal government must continue to refine, combine, integrate, and become as efficient as possible in order to progress.

As previously stated, there is an increasing interdependence between governmental agencies and departments. In the Department of State, the Secretary of State is the overall lead and coordinator for integrated United States Government efforts for Reconstruction and Stabilization operations. The Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DoD), and many other offices have defined roles as support to the Department of State, as listed in National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44).¹⁵

¹² The U.S. President, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011.

¹³ The U.S. President, *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 44*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005).

¹⁴ The U.S. President, *Strategy To Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011.

¹⁵ The U.S. President, *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 44*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005).

The mission of Homeland Defense is another integrated interagency operation. The DoD, at the direction of the President, has the lead for this mission, with the department of Homeland Security and other departments and agencies in supporting roles.¹⁶ Although there is a listing of the roles and responsibilities of the departments, there is no formal structure, specific offices tasked, or individual personnel listed to perform this operation, leaving accountability generally at the Secretary level.¹⁷

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism states that the U.S. counterterrorism effort requires a multi-departmental and multinational effort that exceeds traditional functions and requires an integrated campaign that harnesses every tool of American power.¹⁸ The Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime organizes around the principle of building, balancing, and integrating the tools of American power to combat transnational crime.¹⁹

There are many more cases of direction through policy channels that seek Whole-of-Government and integrated solutions. It is a concept that is in a growth stage right now. Yet, in very few instances is there guidance on the structure of the organization. NSPD 44 is one of the few exceptions that names a lead and supporting agencies directly. Absent this guidance, this leaves the Departments to choose to participate rather than be directed to provide required resources and to participate at appropriate levels. NSPD 44 also leaves open the overall responsibility and accountability for operations, with only the President at the top. While it is true that the regular attendees of the National Security

¹⁶ The Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 2.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The U.S. President, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011), 2.

¹⁹ The U.S. President, *Strategy To Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2011), 2.

Council (NSC), according to NSPD 1, are the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and that the NSC Principals Committee, made up of Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff to the President, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is the senior interagency forum, the burden for accountability, responsibility, coordination, and integration still falls singularly on the President.²⁰ Similar to the creation of the DoD, the Secretary of Defense position, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position and the other Joint Staff positions for overall DoD management, this situation is ripe for additional positions in the National Security Council to manage this coordination among departments and agencies and to carry the overall responsibility and accountability for the success of national security integrations. The creation of those organizational structures and positions in the DoD further defined and organized the roles, internal and external to the individual Services, as well as eliminated the individual budgetary competition for survival . It also gave a final voice for coordination and support decisions. These are examples of the types of changes that need to happen at the national policy level.

In addition to the interagency integrations discussed, historical studies, such as those noted earlier by Secretary McNamara and resulting House Armed Services Committee studies throughout the last five decades, have called for more Reserve Component involvement and increased military integrations. It is imperative to exploit these actions during the economic downturn, and to continue them as the economy improves. Not only is there a burgeoning inter-dependence between government agencies

²⁰ The U.S. President, *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 1*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005).

external to the DoD, there is also a demanding growth of internal inter-dependence between the Active Component and the Reserve Component forces within the DoD. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 does not define strategic reserve, but does define operational reserve as “an emergency reserve of men and/or materiel established for the support of a specific operation”.²¹ This definition does not apply to the more complex concepts of strategic and operational reserves as applied to the ways the Reserve Component is trained and utilized.

Although there is no standardized definition, and proposed definitions have yet to be validated, a proposed definition for strategic reserve by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Whitlock of the U.S. Army Reserve that seems to be gaining momentum is: “an expansion force and repository of forces to be called upon during a national crisis”, and, although a very lofty and demanding vision in application for all Service’s Reserve Components, a more complete definition of an operational reserve as he proposed for inclusion in JP 1-02 is:

The total Reserve Component structure that operates across the continuum of military missions performing both strategic and operational roles in peacetime, wartime, contingency, domestic emergencies, and homeland defense operations. As such, the Services would organize, resource, equip, train, and utilize their Guard and Reserve Components to support mission requirements to the same standards as their Active Components. Each Service's force generation plan would prepare both units and individuals to participate in missions, across the full spectrum of military operations, in a cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and civilian employers.²²

Utilizing these definitions, and in an attempt to make the total military force more

²¹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, Joint Operations*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office/electronic publication, 15 October 2010), 272.

²² Joseph E. Whitlock, “Joint Matters, What is an Operational Reserve”, http://www.ameriforce.net/PDF/rng_dec07/RNG_Dec07_006-008.pdf (accessed 16 April, 2012)..

efficient, the Air Force Reserve Components have adopted and transitioned to operational reserves, while the other Services have not. They are either slowly testing the concept on specific units or at least contemplating doing the same.²³ Realigning the military for greater utilization of the Reserve Component, or to be more efficient overall, has been cited as a potentially significant source of savings for many years. Throughout the 1990s, the DoD and outside organizations reported that several thousands of military personnel were performing functions that could be performed by civilians or contracted out to the private sector.²⁴

With either a shift to more reliance in the Reserve Component, or an increase in civilians performing previous military functions, the military is still required to have or develop cadre forces and cadre training for surges and rapid build up at the onset of an impending conflict. In that way, the military can reduce in capacity and cost during peacetime without the loss of capability or expertise for war.

The follow-on to single Service Reserve Component integrations are integrations between the Service components. Current deficiencies in doctrine pose a significant challenge, though. The U.S. needs to develop new doctrine for joint integrations, which will eliminate the cumbersome and overwhelming workload involved with creating and maintaining support agreements and memoranda of agreements required to bring organizations together. Currently, there is also no budget solution or doctrinal solution for long-term integrations between Services in a peacetime non-operational training environment. This requires integrated units to return to the parent Services for budgetary

²³ Wormuth, Flournoy, Henry, and Murdock, "THE FUTURE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES, THE BEYOND GOLDWATER-NICHOLS PHASE III REPORT", *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, (Washington D.C., 2006), 10-11.

²⁴ General Accounting Office, *DoD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles Could Provide Significant Benefits*, (GAO/NSIAD-95-5: October 1994).

support while being removed from the budgetary processes. There is a growth area that can be revolutionized, though, from the use of joint task force support models. The change of paradigm involves bringing the operational concepts, guidance, etc. into the training environment to solve the gaping issues in unity of command, unity of effort, and support.

Finally, there must be consideration for the option of coalition integrations. The British military, out of necessity, has integrated joint functions placing different Services together in nontraditional roles. They have cut their budget to an extremely lean condition and reduced overall resources to a critical level. In order to maintain certain capabilities, they will need to look to coalition options. An example is the reduction of the aircraft carrier capabilities. In some scenarios, they will have to look to partners to maintain British aircraft carrier operations capabilities. There will be difficulties in working out the details, but this is a unique opportunity for the U.S. to evolve, or least experiment at minimum risk. Coalition partner integrations will happen throughout Europe. As a minimum, the U.S. needs to develop a base of knowledge on these types of operations and organizations.

CONCLUSION

Through comprehension of the system used to develop the military force structure in the United States and the use of relevant historic examples in the recognition of the cycle that leads to a “hollow force”, the military can institute measures to move toward achieving balance in national security and discontinue that cycle. If there is a paradigm shift at the national policy level, and adoption of suggestions such as these, national security will experience a synergistic increase at lower comprehensive budgetary cost.

The Department of Defense (DoD) needs to use updated force planning tools to prevent a future “hollow force”. In order to break the continuous cycle of the past fifty years that periodically causes the conditions for a “hollow force”, the U.S. military force-structuring planners need to gain a complete understanding of the U.S. strategic framework, and its limitations, which is the foundation of the current force structure. In addition, they need to understand the background of the historical pattern leading to a “hollow force” and the potential methods for achieving balance. Without a basic understanding of national strategy and the reasoning behind its connection to resources in the U.S., there is no foundation for stable planning. Through the study of vignettes from the last two major conflicts, the geo-political and economic conditions leading up to them, and the military postures throughout their eras, one can glean a better understanding of the recurring patterns. One can also follow the changes in threats that the U.S. faces and the type of inter-dependant organizations needed to defeat those threats. Finally, through exploring methods of achieving balance, multiple avenues are

opened to meet our capability requirements while continuing to reduce our overall capacity.

There are economic forecasts that project that the U.S. government cannot sustain the high level of costs and that the national deficit will continue to increase.¹ Despite the competition for the budget, critical capability losses are not inevitable. In addition, reductions in cost and capacity do not have to be negative in their effects. The way that the military responds and adapts to the new budget can initiate an intellectual growth period that produces a smaller, more integrated, and more cost efficient force structure. The re-examination and alteration of our current processes and mindsets can be the catalyst for the enlightenment of structuring the future military force.

It is imperative that the governmental agencies cooperate and integrate. That applies to Active Component, Reserve Component, Inter-agency, and Multi-national. Once the level of progress is sufficient, multiple programs in each department can reduce in personnel, equipment, and infrastructure. In addition, the U.S. currently has the ability to completely eliminate programs that are outdated and to plan more efficiently with available resources for defeating potential future threats. Studying how we deal with this period of defense budget reductions can provide an evolution in future planning, as well as transform the military into a more effective and efficient organization, and as such is a continuous required tasking for the military planners. There can be no room for neglect on the part of the military or those decision makers that govern it. In the words of Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, “A government which neglects its army under any pretext whatever is thus culpable in the eyes of posterity, since it prepares humiliation for its

¹ USJFCOM, *op cit.*

standards and its country, instead of by a different course preparing for success”.² The repercussions of which are also echoed by Sun Tzu in his statement that “when your weapons are dulled and ardour damped, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, neighboring rulers will take advantage of your distress to act. And even though you have wise counselors, none will be able to lay good plans for the future”.³

² Jomini, A. H., and C. Messenger, *op cit.*, 44.

³ Samuel B. Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 73.

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